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Introduction
Wage differences between men and women have often been attributed to
three general causes:

first, the differences in personal characteristics

such as education or experience; second, the psychic cost of working with
women, which we call "taste discrimination" and is discussed, for example,
by B~ck.er (1957) and Arrow (1972 ) ;

and third, women's relative im-

mobility resulting in a poor bargaining position and monopsonistic exploita
tion in the labor market as suggested by Krueger (1963) and Thurow (1968).
In fact, since monopsony could affect both

men and women, this third cause

allows for the possibility that men are more hurt by rnonopsonistic discrimina
tion than are women.

It is this last type of wage discrimination that has

received the least attention in the literature and that we plan to focus on.
here.
Many people have discussed the interdependencies of these sources of
wage differentials.

The first two are certainly related.

For instance, it

is frequently argued that the amount of schooling that women choose to obtain or the experience they have is affected by the discrimination they face
in the labor market.
mutually dependent.

In addition, taste and monopsonistic discrimination are
Both social mores and alternative employment opportunities are

affected by taste discrimination and as well affect the likelihood of monoµsony.
For instance, the relative immobility of women, which is a prerequisite for
monopsony, depends on both social customs and on employment opportunities in
other sectors of the economy.

Two causes of monopsonistic discrimination

can thus be distinguished.
Several authors have noted the importance of socialization in explaining
female labor force behavior.

On the one hand, women might have a preference
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for working close to home or in the same area as their husbands.
Malkiel (1973)

Malkieland

for instance, write "it is generally presumed by employers

that a working wife will quit her job when the husband's job changes so as
to require the family to move." 1 By extension, once the husband has found
a job, the wife typically looks for employment within a geographically re
stricted area.

Her geographical immobility then might result in a lower

rate of return to her skills because of the limited selection of jobs.

But

as well, she might be subject to monopsonistic discrimination due to her
immobility.
Oaxaca (1973)

Alternatively, women might prefer certain occupations over others.
argues that, "social conditioning starting with child-

hood experiences is in large part responsible for the seemingly voluntary
occupational choices of so many women." 2 Again the choice of jobs is limited,
resulting in a lower return to women's skills as well as decreasing a woman's
occupational mobility.
Quite a different explanation of monopsony comes not from women's
personal preferences but from the industrial structure.

Women might be ex

cluded from some occupations and industries, as a result of discrimination
by employers and employees.

As Bergmann (1971) argues, they are then crowded

into the remaining sectors of the economy.

Moreover, they become effectively

less mobile within the occupational structure,

Once again; we could expect

to find a lower rate of return to women's skills for two reasons:

first,

the limited choice of jobs and second, the additional effect of monopsony.
This discussion should make clear that it is impossible, both theoreti
cally and empirically, to disentangle the separate effects of taste or
monopsonistic discrimination on characteristic rates of return.

Our aim

in this paper, however, is simply to test for the existence of monopsonv
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and to measure the overall impact on wages due to differentia ls in rates
of return and characteris tics.
In Section I we review briefly the existing theoretical and empirical
work on monopsony in the labor market.

The theoretical implication s of

monopsonis tic discriminat ion are analyzed under alternative

supply elasticity

assumptions and according to the degree of exploitatio n in Section II, in
which :lt is found that under certain conditions an affirmative action wage
equalii~atio n policy may hurt women.

Section III presents our empirical

methodology for testing for monopsony and a statistical analysis based on
the 1970 Public Use Samples.

The results obtained indicate that the wages

of neveir-marri ed women are significant ly affected by monopsony in the
labor market, whereas men's wages do not appear to be,

We conclude that

monopsonis tic discriminat ion thus accounts for some proportion of the
difference between male and female wages that has been formerly attributed
solely to tastP dis·criminat ion.
I,

The Literature
Monopsony is a theme that appears repeatedly in the literature in

general terms, but rarely with any empirical content.

The standard theoretical

references are still Robinson (1932), Rothschild (1954), Krueger
Bronfenbren ner (1956).

(1963), and

While Bronfenbren ner considers a non-profit maxi

mizing firm, Robinson, Rothschild and Krueger take a more traditional approach,
which we will also follow.

The second section of this paper describes in

some detail our theoretical framework.
The little empirical work that has been done is indirect and only
loosely tied to the theory.

Douglas (1939, 1948), for instance, finds that
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actual factor shares are not significantly different from competitivelv
determined shares, but he does not distinguish between monopolistic and
monopsonistic exploitation.
Bunting (1962) measures concentration ratios of employers in 1774
areas, but does not test how concentration affects wages.

Finally, Nelson

(1973) tries to measure the elasticity of labor supply to particular in
dustri1?s, but again, does not relate the elasticity to actual wage de
termination.

None of the empirical work looks into the possibility of

monopsonistic discrimination, although Robinson poses the problem and the
standard literature on discrimination pays attention to it. 3
II.

Theoretical Framework
While our theoretical framework is not original, there are several

assumptions and implications which we want to emphasize.

From this dis

cussion, we obtain several hypotheses which we test in Section III.
We distinguish several cases according to the degree of monopsony
power held by an employer 4 and to the supply elasticity of labor.

On the

one hand, women might be more subject to monopsony power than are men; but
on the 1Jther hand, they might have greater supply elasticities as a result
of their alternatives in household production.

For each of these cases,

we make predictions first about the wages of women relative to men; second
about the response of wages to changes in supply elasticities; third about
the effect on employment and wages of a wage equalization affirmative action
policy; and fourth about the validity of the usual estimates of pure taste
discrimination. 5
The standard theory of monopsonistic discrimination considers only
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the case where both groups face a monopsonist
6

(or infinite) supply elasticities.

and both groups have positive

The basic result is well known: the group

with a lower supply elasticity is paid a lower wage.

In addition, we

can say that an increase in the supply elasticity will increase the wage;
a wage equalization policy will lower or leave unchanged (raise) the wage
of the higher (lower) paid group and lower or leave unchanged (raise) its
employment;

7

and finally, the usual

measure of taste discrimination is an underestimate if the group affected
by taste discrimination has the higher supply elasticity.
Each of these propositions can be explained with the following model
of a discriminating monopsonist:
The monopsonist maximizes proftts by hiring either female or male labor,
which are perfect substitutes in production but which have different supplv
functions.

w.r.t. Lf,Lm
giving the first order conditions:
dWf
MRP (Lf+Lm) - Wf(l + dL
f

Lf

-)
wf

= MRP - Wf (1 +

.!. )
.,,f

= 0

dW
L
m ~)
= MRP - W (1 + .!. ) = 0
MRP (L + L) - W (1 + dL
w
m
w
m
m
nm
m
m

where MRP is:

marginal revenue product
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Wi:

the wage of group i, f = women, m = men

Li:

the employment of group i

ni:

the supply elasticity of group i

Our first conclusion follows from the first order conditions.

The second

comes from differentiating a first order condition, with respect ton,
holding MRP constant.

The third can be obtained by letting profits be a

function of Wf and k, where kWf = Wm.
imply that dWf/dk < O.

If Wf

>

The second order conditions then

Wm (Wf<Wm) in the case of a discriminating

monopsonist, then a wage equalization policy by changing the value of k
will result in a decrease (increase) in Wf.

8

The wage changes then imply

changes in employment along the relevant supply curves.

Finally, if women

have higher supply elasticities than men, such that the discriminating
monopsonist tends to pay women a higher wage, then the observed wage differen
tial for standardized labor quality is an underestimate of the effects of
taste discrimination.

On the other hand, if men are perfectly mobile among

firms, the discriminating monopsonist pays men the competitive wage which
is above the women's wage.

Then the observed wage differential is an over

estimate of the effects of taste discrimination.
Figures 1 and 2 illustrate these cases.
In figure 1, we take the case of a pure monopsonist which has some
control over the wage paid to men as well as to women.

In order to maximize

profits, the discriminating monopsonist will hire Lfo women and Lmo men,
paying wages equal to Wf

o

and W •
mo

Since the supply elasticity for women

exceeds that of men, by assumption, women's wage exceeds that of men.

From
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this, we can see that an increase in the supply elasticity will result in
a higher wage paid.

Moreover, if women are typically paid less then men,

the effects of taste discrimination must more than offset the effects of
monopsonistic discrimination (given our assumption about the relative supply
elasticities).

Under a wage equalization affirmative action plan, the

employer no longer equalizes the MFC across groups.

Instead, the employer

will hire workers up to the point where the curve which is marginal to
the aggregate supply function equals marginal revenue product.

In figure

1, the nondiscriminating monopsonist will employ Lfl women and Lml men,
decreasing wages and employment of women and increasing wages and employ
ment of men, compared with the discriminating monopsonist.
Figure 2 illustrates the case where the employer is a monopsonist
in the employment of women, but a perfectly competitive employer of men.
Since the monopsonist pays women a lower wage then men, the observed wage
differential is partially attributable to monopsony and only partially
attributable to taste discrimination.

That is, the usual estimates of

taste discrimination are overestimates.
Once we consider the case of negative supply elasticities, our resu~ts
change.

A profit maximizing monopsonist will never operate along the

negative region of a labor supply curve.

An equilibrium where marginal

factor costs equals marginal revenue product at a point where the supply
elasticity is negative might be a local, but not a global maximum.

There

fore, negative labor supply elasticities are consistent only with employers
opeEating in a competitive labor market.
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III.

Testing for Monopsony
In this section we describe our test for the existence of monopsony

in male and female labor markets.

Our procedure, which is based on the

main implication of the theory outlined in Section II--that if markets
are

characterized by monopsony, supply elasticities should be signifi

cantly and positively related to wage rates--is to estimate the association
between wages and supply elasticities, controlling for personal characteris
tics.

The empirical analysis will in addition enable us to ascertain

whether a simple "affirmative action" wage equalization policy is likely
to benefit or harm women and whether· the usual residual measures of taste
discrimination against women are under or overestimates of the "true"
discrimination component of male and female wage differentials.
Our procedure for testing for the predicted positive relationship
between wages paid and the supply elasticities of men and women consists
of two stages:

in the first, samples of males and females are divided into

geographical groups corresponding to identifiable labor markets.

Supply

elasticities of the individuals within each market for each sex are esti
mated.

In the second stage these elasticity estimates based on the in

dividuals in each area are then entered into an earnings equation which is
run across the set of markets.

Thus, while the theory of monopsony is

formulated in terms of the supply elasticities to individual firms, our
empirical analysis is based on relations between labor market aggregates.
Therefore, for the test outlined to be valid it is necessary to assume
that the strength of the association between aggregate wages and the market
elasticities of supply is a continuous positive function of the degree of
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monopsony characterizing the labor market.

Moreover, an estimated negative

mean market elasticity in an SMSA does not imply that monopsony does not
characterize some part of that SMSA's labor market even though a negatively
sloped supply curve to a firm is inconsistent with that firm's being a
monopsonist.

The size of the estimated aggregate elasticity merely in

dicates what segment of a backward-bending supply curve the average in'
dividual in the SMSA is in. It is possible therefore for a significant
proportion of the population to be on the positively-sloped part of their
supply curves and face monopsonistic situations even though on average,
the elasticity is negative.

Whatever

the sign of the mean SMSA elasticity,

therefore, if there is a significant degree of monopsony in that market,
there may still be a positive relationship between the mean elasticity and
the average wage.
Equations (1) and (2) correspond to the estimating equations in the
two stages:

in equation (1), the labor-force participation variable Lijk

(1)

j = 1 ••• ni' i = 1 ••• s, k = male, female

lnWik

(2)

of the j th individual of sex kin the i th labor market is regressed against
that individual's vector of personal characteristics Xijkh and predicted wagewijk
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The set of estimated mean elasticity

estimates

e

with Yik' the

set of average sex-specific wage-determining characteristics for each labor
market i,are then used as regressors in wage function (2) which is run
across the S markets.

The test for the existence of monopsony in the male

and female labor markets is thus whether bmn and/or bfn
a.

>

0.

The Sample
The data sets utilized, the Public Use Samples of the 1970 Census of

Population,were chosen because they contain sufficient numbers of obser
vations for the two-stage testing procedure and because they provide many
of the relevant characteristics needed for the proper estimation of the
supply and wage equations.

Unfortunately, one important earnings determinant-

labor-force experience--is not available from these tapes so that it was
necessary to exclude all women who have ever been married from our samples,
This was done because the usual computed proxy for work experience, age
less years of schooling minus 5, is not an accurate one for these women

.

and its use would therefore contaminate our coefficient estimates in the
female labor-force participation and wage equations.

Malkiel and Malkiel

(1973) and S·awhill (1973) have shown that the computed work experience
variable, however, is a reasonable estimate of the actual work history of
single women and males.

Moreover, since a greater proportion of adult

males and single women work than married women, estimates of the potential
wage of men and single women not currently in the labor force, based on
the earnings of working males and non-married women, will be subject to
less of a "selectivity bias" than would be obtained in a sample of married
women. 9

We need such estimates of potential earnings to obtain unconditional
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supply elasticities.
For these reasons, only never-married, non-farm, not self-employed
white females not currently in school, aged 19-66 and living in SMSA's
from the 1:100 Census tape were chosen for our sample of women.

The male

sample, however, consisted of all men without regard to marital status
who met all the other criteria applied to the female group.

To ohtain

a male sample that was of comparable size to that of the single women,
the 1:1000 tape was used as a data base.
Both the male and female samples were grouped by SMSA; those SMSA's
containing samples of men or women numbering less than 50 were excluded
from the final data sets in order that all the intra-SMSA labor-force
participation equations could be run over enough observations to obtain
reasonably precise coefficient estimates.

This procedure yielded a final

sample consisting of 95 SMSA's and a total of 18408 males and 30155 nevermarried women.
b.

Intra-SMSA Supply Functions
To obtain unconditional male and female labor-supply elasticities for

each of the 95 SMSA's a two-stage least-squares regression technique was
utilized.

10

First, exogenous predicted wage variables, representing the

potential wages of all individuals in the sample, were derived from estimating
equations in which the natural logarithim of the hourly wage rates of all
men or all women reporting earnings in 1969 (96 percent of all men, 87
percent of the never-married women) were regressed against schooling level,
age, age squared, and an occupational demand index for each sex group in
each SMSA.

This latter variable was computed by dividing the male-female
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employment ratio of the individual's occupation in the SMSA by the male
female ratio for that occupation in the aggregate U.S. population; i.e.,
the index for an individual in SMSA i employed in occupation q is
[mi/fi]q/[m/f]q.
Since our hypothesis is that if monopsony exists, then the wage paid
and the supply elasticity of the individual will be correlated, it is
necessary to assume that the supply elasticities are randomly distributed
irt the population in order that unbiased estimates of wage offers can be
obtained.

If this assumption holds, that is, if the responsiveness of

labor supply to wage changes is uncorrelated with such personal characteris
tics as age, experience, education, then any error in the first-stage wage
predicting equation resulting from the exclusion of the (individuals')
supply elasticity variable should be impounded exclusively in the residual
error term.
The second-stage (unconditional) labor supply equations were run
separately on all men and all women in each SMSA sample regardless of labor
force status.

The participation measure used, annual hours worked, was

computed by multiplying the reported weeks worked during 1969 by the weekly
hours worked in the Census week in 1970 and was set equal to zero for
individuals not in the labor force.

11

Annual hours was selected as the

dependent variable rather than weeks worked during the year because the
use of the latter variable would have resulted in a downward bias in the
estimated predicted wage coefficient (and the elasticity), given a positive
correlation between weeks worked per year and hours worked in the week.
Moreover, Fuchs (1967 ) has shown that the error component in the hours
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variable computed in the manner described tends to be quite small.

Thus

any spurious negative association between the computed annual hours and
hourly wage variables due to the measurement error in the latter being
inversely related to measurement error in the former, is likely to be
negligible.
The independent variables appearing in both the male and female supply
equations in addition to the predicted wage are own non-earned income, age,
age squared, and educational level.

For the married, spouse-pres ent men

other variables were included to capture the intra-famil y substitutio n and
additional income and household productivit y effects.

These are the non

earned income, age, and educational level of the wife and the number of
children less than 6 years of age in the household.

In addition, a dummy

for marital history ( 1 = divorced or separated, 0 otherwise) was added.
Table 1 displays the results of the male and female supply equations
obtained from regressions run on the total sample .

Since the labor-suppl y

elasticitie s to be used in the second-stag e were obtained from regressions
pertaining to each of the 95 SMSA's these results are presented for illustra
tive purposes only.

The signs and significanc e of the coefficient s conform

in general to the ususal theoretical and empirical labor-suppl y findings in
the literature.

In the whole-sampl e male equation, both the own and wife's

non-earned income coefficient s, which capture the pure income effect on
labor supply, are negative and significant at the 1 percent level; of the
95 SMSA male equations, 72 of the male non-earned income coefficient s dis
played a negative sign and 60 wife's non-earned income coefficient s were
negative.

The probability of obtaining these results from a sample population
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in which the coefficients are randomly distributed are less than .01 and
.OS respectively.

The whole-sample coefficient of the child variable

is positive and significant (1 percent) and the variable had a positive
coefficient in 56 of the 95 regressions (p = ,18), indicating that the
presence of children in the household increases the labor-force partici
pation of males, as found by Smith (1971).
The estimated country-wide elasticity for the males is positive; however,
in 62 of the SMSA equations the computed elasticity was negative.

These

results contrast with Finegan's (1962) well-known estimates of a negative
hours-elasticity, obtained from aggregate interindustry and interoccupational

cross-sections based on the 1940 and 1960 Censuses.

As

Feldstein (1968) has argued, however, Finegan's findings may have been
plagued by simultaneous equations bias.

Our results are more consistent

with those of Feldstein, who found that of his eleven labor-supply re
gressions run on separate samples of mainly male workers only 4 had significant
negative (conditional) wage coefficients.

To test for the existence of

a backward-bending supply curve, a quadratic predicted wage was entered in
the whole-sample male equation (column 4).

The negative significant co

efficient on this term indicates that the male supply curve does bend back,
but at a turning point at the tail end of the sample wage distribution. 13
In the whole-sample never-married female equation, the non-earned income
variable coefficient also displays the correct sign; in 85 of the 95 SMSAs
negative coefficients were obtained for this variable (p < .00001).

The

mean elasticity for the individual sample is positive, but in 51 SMSAs
the computed elasticity is negative.

Again, the addition of the squared
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predicted wage term in the second column provides evidence of a backward
bending never-ma rried female supply curve.

As in the male group, however,

the turning-p oint occurs at a wage at the high end of the observati ons in
the sample.
As one means of checking the sensitivi ty of the elasticit y estimates
to the possibili ty of selectivi ty bias, condition al female supply elasticit ies
were estimated from regressio ns run only on employed women.

It was expected

that the wage elasticit y obtained from the sample of working women would
be less than the unconditi onal elasticit y estimate of .32 given that the
participa tion decision is uninfluen ced by the (negative ) income effect.

The com

puted condition al elasticit y was ~16, indicatin g that any dovmward bias in the
unconditi onal estimate is not so severe as to make it fall short of this lower
bound.
c.

Inter-SMSA Earnings functions
The functiona l form of the earnings equations to which the computed

SMSA elasticit ies are added is that formulate d and applied by Mincer (1974)
and used by Malkiel and Malkiel (1973) and Thomas Johnson (1969) and is
given by (3):

k = m,f

(3)

Yik' Sik' Eik' and Rik are the mean levels of annual earnings, schooling ,
labor-for ce experienc e (=age - S - 5), and annual hours worked of all
those employed in 1969 for the two sex groups in each of the 95 SMSAs.
nik is the mean SMSA elasticit y for each sex computed from the estimated
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labor supply equations.

This latter variable, crucial for our test, is

probably measured with considerable error so that a bias toward zero in
the elasticity coefficient is expected.

The direction of the biases pro

duced in the other coefficients due to the errors in the elasticity variable
can be computed according to the technique of Levi (1973) and are indicated
below,
Because it was suspected that the unexplained variance in average
earnings might vary inversely with SMSA size the Goldfeld-Quand t test was
applied to the unweighted samples.

It was concluded that both the male

and female equations were characterized by this form of heteroscedasti city
(5 percent level) and the observations were thus weighted by (SMSA size/
10,000) 112 •
Table 2 presents the results from the weighted OLS regressions on the
95 SMSA's. In the 'narrow' form of the earnings function for both men and
women {specification I), the coefficients conform generally to those ob
tained by others; however, the rates of return to schooling (treb 1k) for
both men and never-married women are nigher than those that have been re
ported elsewhere.

To ascertain if these results are a function of the use

of the 1970 population, a data base not exploited as of yet in the literature,
or are the product of the selection procedure limiting the sample to the
larger SMSA's, the earnings equations were run across (male, female) in-
dividuals of similar characteristics from the 1:10,000 tapes but without
regard to residence.

The returns to schooling obtained were 7.8 % for males

and 12.3% for the never married women.

14

It appears that the estimated

male return to schooling is increased more significantly by the exclusion
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of individuals residing outside of the larger SMSA's than is the case
for the never-marri ed women.
Another quantitativ e difference in the earnings function results is
that neither of the experience terms are statistical ly significant .

How

ever, together the two variables contribute significant ly (5 percent level)
to the explanatory power of the earnings equation for both sexes, indicating
that the experience variables are highly collinear in the aggregate sample.
In specificatio n II, the computed elasticity term is added to test
for the existence of monopsony.

As can be seen, the elasticity coefficient

is positive and significant for the never-marri ed women (5 percent level,
one-tailed test) but does not attain significanc e for men.

The addition

of SMSA size (specificati on III), found by Fuchs (1967) to be an important
determinant of inter-city wage differentia ls, does not alter this result.
As the elasticity-e arnings relationshi p does not appear to be significant
for males, men are not subject to monopsonis tic exploitatio n to the extent
that women are.

Thus because of the significant positive correlation

between female supply elasticitie s and wage rates, it appears that the
earnings of never-marri ed women are in part lower than their male counter
parts' due to the existence of monopsonis tic discriminat ion.
Table 3 presents the direction of the measurement biases calculated for
the women's specificatio n III, according to Levi's (1973) technique.

As

expected, the coefficient on the elasticity variable is biased towards zero.
The rate of return or education also has a downward bias, indicating that
13.1 percent is an underestima te of the true rate of return to education
for never-marri ed women.

-18-

Finally, Table 4 presents our estimates of the magnitude of the
combined effect of taste plus monopsonistic discrimination in columnfour.
Even using a sample of never-married women, arid after adjusting for differ
ences in endowments,that is

for elasticity, schooling, experience, hours

worked, and city size we find an unexplained earnings differential of about
35% in our sample.

Our estimate is in the same range as Oaxaca (1973)

[.29], Fuchs (1971) [.34], higher then Malkiel and Malkiel (1973) [.19] and
lower than Sawhill (1973) [.43].

However, we have shown that this computed

residual differential cannot be interpreted as a measure of taste discrimina
tion only, but in part can be attributed to the existence of monopsony.
Table 5 shows that much of the differential in earnings is due to
the lower return to education

and experience of never-married women, as

well as to women's fewer years of experience.

The constant term of the

regression, or the part of the wage differential which is not explained by
the variables used, goes in favor of women.
Conclusion
We have shown in the theoretical section of our paper that the usual
residual measures of the "taste" discrimination component of male-female
wage differentials found in the literature were likely to be overestimates
of this form of discrimination.

''Taste" discrimination on the part of

employers was shown to be one of two possible immobilizing pre-conditions
for the monopsonistic exploitation of women, which could result in lower
wages for women relative to men if the market for male labor were competitiv~.
Since the immobility of women could also result from their socialized
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behavior, there is thus no way to evaluate the importance of taste versus
monopsonistic discrimination in accounting for sex differences in earnings,
controlling for personal characteristics.
Our empirical analysis, based on estimated supply curves in 95 labor
markets, supports the hypothesis that some part of the uneacplained sex
differential in wages can be attributed to monopsonistic discrimination.
Because we could not use measures of supply elasticities to individual firms,
our analysis is thus a strong test for the existence of monopsony.

There

fore, it must be noted that the positive and significant relation between
the supply elasticities and earnings of never-married women does not in
dicate that all firms are monopsonists, but only that enough firms act as
discriminating monopsonists with respect to these women so as to show
up in our data.

Moreover, it should be emphasized that our finding of no

significant relationship between the market supply elasticities of males and
male wages cannot be interpreted to mean that no males are subject to
rnonopsonistic exploitation but only that we could not reject the null hy
pothesis of competitive male labor markets.
Finally, what does our conclusion concerning the importance of monoi'
sonistic discrimination with respect to never-married women imply about
the earnings of married females?

While~ priori we might expect married

women to be less geographically mobile than single women and thus the
wage-supply elasticity relationship to be more significant in a statistical
sense for this group, we can not say to what extent married women ex
perience monopsonistic wage reductions relative to single women without
testing for the existence of monopsonistic discrimination based on marital
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status as well as sex.

Given this additio nal form of monops onistic dis

crimin ation, our results su~ges t that married women might receive
higher
wage

rates than single females , as a result of their relativ ely high

elastic ity of supply to the labor market .
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Table 1
Estima.tes of Unconditional Supply Equations (Annual Hours Worked)
Countrywide Sample

----Coefficients and t-ratios
Women

Variable

32.9721
(15. 800) **

WAGE
WAr,E

----

2

103.9272
(12.543)**

Men

124.8304
(14.068)**

368.0092
(10. 218)**
-3.0808
(6.959)**

-.28022
(8.848)**
4. 35680

-30. 6303
(5.502)**

45. 8811
(33.032)**

36.0870
(20.333)**

59.7063
(25.329)**

60.3683
(25.629)**

64.3480
(19.300)**

50.5419
(13.040)**

-.12696
(25.495)**

-.79143
(26.478)**

-.97902
(26.489)**

• 99811
(26.961)**

-.12696
(27.362)**

-.17243
(24.918)**

-.10317
(20.229)**

-.16532
(16.082)**

AGEW

3.1519
(4. 356)**

3.1624
(4.376)**

EDUCW

13.8718
(7.129)**

13.7654
(7.081)**

NEINCW

-.00983
(2.209)**

-. 01177
(2.645)**

STATUS

56.2013
(1. 701)

58.2694
(1. 760)

CHILD

31.5404
(3. 789)**

30.7519
(3. 698) **

EDUC
AGE
AGE

2

NEINC

C

R2
n

-426.4518

-526.0909

.090
18408

(1. 818)

-3.5727

.092

.138

.140

18408

30155

30155

** Significant at the 1 percent level (two-tailed test)

Source:

1970 Public Use Sample

-152.6279

Table 2
Estimates of Earnings Functions (ln of Annual Earnings)
----·-·-

---------·
Coefficients and t-ratios
Men

Women

Variable
I

II

III

I

II

III

EDUC

.12340
(5.950)**

.12642
(6.150)**

.13070
(6. 744)**

.13762
(7.557)**

.13813
(7.466)**

.13897
(7.463)**

EXP

-.00082
(0.020)

-.00144
(0.035)

-.00016
(0.018)

. 03877
(0.420)

. 03892
(0.419)

.Q4518
(0.482)

. 00111
(0.650)

.00113
(0.669)

.00083
(0.519)

-.00046
(0.231)

-.00046
(0.230)

-.00061
(0.302)

.40038
(2.885)**

.38810
(2.830)**

.48788
(3.690)**

.61538
(3. 370)**

.61703
(3. 360)**

.64304
(3. 393)**

.03613
(1. 771)*

.03177
(1.652)*

--.00295
(0.196)

-.00320
(0.212)

EXP

2

LNHRS

.00002
(0. 500)

.00013
(3.250)**

SMSA
C

3. 71640
(3.664)**

3. 75628
(3. 700)U

2.88426
(2.960)**

2. 07390
(1. 090)

R2

.443

.453

.569

.492

** Significant at the.5 percent level (one-tailed test)
*

Significant at the 5 percent level (one-tailed test)

Source:

1970 Public Use Sample

2.05248
(1. 068)

.496

1. 76079
(0.885)

.542

Table 3
Bias in Coefficients of Women's Equation Due to Errors
in Measurement of Elasticity 1

Variable

EDUC

Bias

1

EXP

LNHRS

+

+

n

SMSA

C

+

See Levi (1973)

Table 4
Predicted Annual Earnings, Based on Earnings Function 1

Specification

Characteristics
of women

(b)

(a)

Women's Function (e)

Characteristics
of men

Ratio

(a)/(b)

Monopsony, Taste
Discrimination
Earnings Differential
1-(a) / (b)

$4912

$ 6863

• 715

.28

$7726

$10541

• 734

.27

.636

.651

III

Men's function

(f)

III

Ratio (e) / (f)

1
Across 95 SMSA's

Table 5
Component Differentials

Variable

e

Xf(ef - em)

e

Bm(Xf - Xm)

EDUC

.8864

1.1077

F..XP

.5741

.6155

EXP 2

1.2488

1. 2595

.9989

.9998

n

SMSA

1.0131

1.0

C

3.0756

0

6

EB (Xf - X)
m

o m

HRSf

e

.4879-.6430 HRS .6430
f
HRS

m

6

Cf - Cm
= e

re (Xf - X) • HRS .6430

e o m

f

m

HRS

= D·U• E

m

where Dis the effect of the differences in the regression coefficients,
U is the unexplained term (the constant) in the regression equation,
Eis the effect of differences in endowments.
D = .207,

U = 3.076,

E = .733,

D.U. =.636

Footnotes
*Assistant professors, Yale University.

We have benefitted from

the helpful comments of Richard Brecher, Martin Baily, Gerald Ford,
James McCabe, and Guy Orcutt.

We would also like to thank Kathryn

Norstrom for her able research assistance.
1
p. 697-698.

2

p. 150.

3

See, for instance, Madden, forthcoming 1975.

4
We ignore the game theoretical problems of dealing explicitly with
degrees of monopsony power.
power and none.

In the theory, we look at absolute monopsony

In the empirical section, we assume that varying degrees

of monopsony power affect wages in a continuous manner.
5

The effect of pure taste discrimination can be measured by the differential

when all markets are perfectly competitive,in wages paid to two workers who
equally productive (e.g., the same education, experience etc.).

See Oaxaca

(1973) and Sawhill (1973) for examples of attempts to measure the effect
of discrimination by controlling for personal characteristics.
however,
6

They confound,

the effects of taste and monopsonistic discrimination.

We are considering only

the case where the discriminating monopsonist

employs both types of labor.

7
There is one complication:

A wage equalization policy might result

in segregation, whereas the discriminating monopsonist hired from each group.
The wage of the group employed will not fall below its wage paid by the
discriminating monopsonist.
8

Samuelson discusses the analogous case of a discriminating and simple

monopolist, Foundations of Et:onomic Analysis, pp. 42-45.
9

For a discussion of the possible biases resulting from the estimation

of the potential wage of non-working women from a sample of employed women see

Gronau (1974).

Heckman (1974) proposes a maximum-likelih ood iterative

method which yields consistent and asymptotically unbiased parameter
estimates for computing the potential wage
dividuals.

offers

of non-employed in

Because the small sample properties of such a technique are mot

known, however, given the size and number of our samples and the exclusion
of· all ever-married women, we did not attempt this procedure.
10

The reason for estimating a predicted wage is to obtain unconditional

supply elasticities rather than to eliminate a simultaneity problem.

With

micro data the dependence of the wage received on the individual's quantity
of work is negligible.

Thus the wage-producing equation is not derived from

a formal simultaneous equation's system.
11

Thus the dependent variable is truncated normal.

Amemiya's (1974)

iterative maximum likelihood estimation technique, which he demonstrates
yields strongly consistant anda:;ymptotica lly normal parameter estimates
when the dependent variable displays this property, was not applied.

See

note 9.
12

Supply equations using annual weeks as the dependent variable were

estimated for a random sub-sample of the SMSA's.

The coefficients were

generally significantly less precise in these equations than in the com
. parable hours regressions.
13

Bognanno et. al. (1974) obtained similar results with a quadratic

wage term in their estimates of the conditional supply elasticities of married
female nurses.
14
Mincer and Polachek (1974) using the 1967 National Longitudinal
Survey estimated a rate of return to schooling of non-married women of 7.7%
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